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Abstract
I introduce a very simple method to defend against adversarial examples. The
basic idea is to raise the slope of the ReLU function at the test time. Experiments
over MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
defense against a number of strong attacks in both untargeted and targeted settings.
While perhaps not as effective as the state of the art adversarial defenses, this
approach can provide insights to understand and mitigate adversarial attacks. It
can also be used in conjunction with other defenses.
1 Introduction
The lockdown has not been too bad! After all, we found some time to explore what we always wanted
to but did not have time for it. For me, I have been passing the time by immersing myself in adversarial
ML. I was playing with the adversarial examples tutorial in PyTorch2 and came across something
interesting. So, I decided to share it with you. It is a simple defense that works well against untargeted
attacks, and to some extent against targeted ones. Here is how it goes. The idea is to train a CNN with
the ReLU activation function but increase its slope at the test time (Fig. 1). Lets call this function
Sloped ReLU or SReLU for short: SReLU(α, x) = α max(0, x), where α is the slope. SReLU
becomes ReLU for α = 1. To investigate this idea, I ran the following CNNs (Fig. 8) over MNIST [1]:
Conv⇒ Pool⇒ SReLU⇒ Conv⇒ Pool⇒ SReLU⇒ FC⇒ SReLU⇒ FC
and over CIFAR-10 [2] (referred to as CIFAR10-CNN1):
Conv⇒ SReLU⇒ Pool⇒ Conv⇒ SReLU⇒ Pool⇒ FC⇒ SReLU⇒ FC⇒ SReLU⇒ FC
I also tried a variation of the latter network with SReLUs only after the first two FC layers (referred
to as CIFAR10-CNN2). I chose α ∈ {0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 100}.
Train with Test withy= max(0,x)
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ReLU defense
Figure 1: Sketch of the the proposed defense. Just increase the ReLU slope at the test time!
∗Code is available at: https://github.com/aliborji/ReLU_defense.git
2https://pytorch.org/tutorials/beginner/fgsm_tutorial.html
Work in progress ...
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2 Experiments and results
Here, I emphasize on the FGSM attack since it is very straightforward [3]. To craft an adversarial
example xadv , FGSM adds a tiny portion of the gradient of the loss w.r.t the input image back to the
input image (i.e. gradient ascent in loss):
xadv = x+ × sign(∇xJ(θ,x, y)) (1)
The perturbed image needs to be clipped to the right range (here [0,1] in all experiments over both
datasets).  ∈ [0, 1] balances the attack success rate versus imperceptibility.  = 0 corresponds to the
model performance on the original test set (i.e. no perturbation). To gain a higher attack rate more
perturbation (i.e. larger ) is needed which leads to a more noticeable change (and vice versa).
The above formulation is for the untargeted attack. For the targeted attack, instead of increasing the
loss for the true class label, we can lower the loss for the desired target class label ytarg (or we could
do both):
xadv = x− × sign(∇xJ(θ,x, ytarg)) (2)
In addition to FGSM, I also considered a number of other strong attacks including BIM (also known
as IFGSM; iterative FGSM) [4], RFGSM [5], StepLL [4], PGD [6], and DeepFool [7]. In almost all
of these attacks (except DeepFool for which I varied the number of iterations), there is a parameter
that controls the magnitude of perturbation (here represented by ). In what follows I will show the
results over MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets against both untargeted and targeted attacks.
2.1 Performance against untargeted attacks
Results are shown in Fig. 2 over entire test sets of datasets. I did not find the SReLU slopes smaller
than one very interesting but I am including them here for the sake of comparison. Their effect is not
consistent. They are useful against targeted attacks but almost always hinder both classifier accuracy
and robustness in untargeted attack settings.
Over MNIST, at α = 1 and  = 0 (top left panel in Fig. 2) classifier accuracy is around 98%
and gradually falls as  grows. For α ∈ {2, 5}, the performance loss starts to recover. Finally,
for α ∈ {10, 100} the classifier has not been impacted at all, hence completely failing the attack.
Classifier performance as a function of slope (averaged over epsilons) for each attack type is shown in
the middle row of Fig. 2. The ReLU defense does very well against FGSM, BIM, RFGSM and PGD
attacks. Over StepLL and DeepFool, however, it neither helped nor harmed the classifier. Results
over the CIFAR-10 dataset are consistent with the MNIST results (middle and right columns in Fig. 2
corresponding to CIFAR10-CNN1 and CIFAR10-CNN2, respectively). On this dataset, the classifier
had around 60% accuracy on the clean test set ( = 0) and went down with more perturbation. Here
again increasing α led to better defense, although sometimes at the expense of accuracy. Please see
Fig. 3 for the performance of each attack type as a function of perturbation magnitude.
Are these findings specific to SReLU function? To answer this question, I swapped the SReLU with
other activation functions and measured the FGSM performance. Now the attacks became even more
damaging (Fig. 2; bottom row) indicating that SReLU does better.
To assess this defense against a wider range of adversarial attacks, I conducted a larger scale analysis
using the Foolbox code repository [8] over the first 2K images of each dataset. The proposed defense
was tested against 25 attacks utilizing different L norms or image transformations (e.g. Gaussian
blurring). The top row in Fig. 4 shows the mean classifier accuracy averaged over all attacks.
Increasing α improved the defense, although there seems to be a trade-off between accuracy and
robustness. Please compare the last  vs.  = 0 in the top row of Fig. 4. Looking across the attacks
(bottom row in Fig. 4 shown only for the last ; 0.3 over MNIST and 0.1 over CIFAR), however,
reveals that the boost in improvement comes only from few attacks against which the defense has
done a great job, in particular FGSM and its variants (e.g. PGD). Against the VirtualAdversarial
attack, the proposed defense made the situation much worse. Overall, it seems that this defense
works better against gradient based attacks as opposed to image degradation ones such as additive
noise, salt and pepper noise, and inversion attack. Nonetheless, the ReLU defense was able to recover
performance loss around 15% over MNIST and around 10-15% over CIFAR-10 (averaged over
attacks; compare α = 100 vs. α = 1 in the bottom row of Fig. 4).
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Figure 2: Performance of the ReLU defense against untargeted attacks. Left column: MNIST.
Middle column: CIFAR-10 with all ReLUs replaced with SReLU, i.e. CIFAR10-CNN1. Right
column: CIFAR-10 with SReLUs only after the first two FC layers, i.e. CIFAR10-CNN2. All 10K
test images of each dataset were used. Rows from top to bottom: ReLU defense against the FGSM
attack, the defense success rate (i.e. accuracy loss recovery) as a function of SReLU slope averaged
over all epsilons (iterations for DeepFool), and the effect of switching to a different activation function
against the FGSM attack. Increasing the SReLU slope improves the performance significantly, except
over StepLL and DeepFool attacks.  = 0 corresponds to the classifier accuracy with no input
perturbation. Higher y value here means better defense.
2.2 Performance against targeted attacks
Performance of the ReLU defense against the targeted FGSM attack is reported in Fig. 5 over the full
test sets of MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. The y axis here shows the success rate of the attack in
fooling the CNN to classify an image as the desired target class (if it has not already been classified
so). As expected, increasing  (perturbation magnitude) leads to higher attack accuracy. Over both
datasets, increasing the SReLU slope (above 1) reduces the attack success rate which means better
defense. Here, ReLU defense seems to perform about the same for slopes greater than one.
Defense results over individual classes are shown in Fig. 6. Increasing the slope helped in 6 classes,
out of 10, using both MNIST CNN and CIFAR10-CNN1. Using CIFAR10-CNN2, 4 classes were
defended better. In the remaining cases, the defense tied with the slope of 1 (i.e. no defense) or
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slightly deteriorated the robustness. On average, it seems that ReLU defense is effective against the
targeted FGSM attack, although not as good as its performance against the untargeted FGSM.
3 Discussion and Conclusion
What is happening? I suspect the reason why this defense works is because it enhances the signal-to-
noise ratio. In the untargeted attack setting, increasing the loss leads to suppressing pixels that are
important in making the correct prediction while boosting irrelevant features. Since relevant features
are associated with higher weights, increasing the SReLU slope will enhance those feature more
compared to the irrelevant ones, hence recovering good features. For the same reason, this defense
is not very effective against targeted attacks. In this setting, the attacker aims to lower the loss in
favor of the target class. Raising the SReLU slope results in enhancing features that are important
to the target class, as well as the true class. This ignites a competition between two sets of features
which can go either way. This explanation is reminiscent of attention mechanisms in human vision
(and also in computer vision), in particular neural gain modulation theories. These theories explain
behavioral and neural data in a variety of visual tasks such as discrimination and visual search [9, 10].
On a related note, elevating the bias of neurons in different layers, as is done in [11], may lead to
similar observations.
An alternative, and perhaps more plausible, explanation is gradient explosion. Increasing the SReLU
slope causes the gradients to explode during back-propagation. Strangely, however, this does not stop
the targeted attacks! In this regard, the ReLU defense falls under the category of defenses that aim to
mask or obfuscate gradients (e.g. [12–15]). Some works have shown that these methods give a false
sense of security and are thus breakable [16]. Training and testing the network with the same slope
(greater than one) did not improve the robustness, which could strengthen the gradient explosion
reasoning.
Is increasing the SReLU slope the same as scaling up the image by a factor? In general, No. Notice
that αmax(0, x) = max(0, αx), for α ≥ 0 and x ≥ 0. For a linear network with positive weights, the
answer is yes, but for non-linear CNNs comprised of positive and negative weights the answer is no.
Just to make sure, I ran an experiment in which I multiplied the pixel values by α and computed the
classifier performance under the untargeted FGSM attack. Results are shown in Fig. 7. Clipping the
pixel values to the [0,1] range (after scaling) did not improve the robustness. Interestingly, without
clipping the pixel values, results resemble those obtained by increasing the SReLU slope (top right
panel in Fig. 7; compare with Fig. 2.). This suggests that maybe instead of increasing the SReLU
slope we can just scale the pixel values! Results over the CIFAR-10 dataset, however, do not support
this hypothesis. On this dataset, scaling does not help robustness with or without clipping. The
discrepancy of results over two datasets can be attributed to the fact that MNIST digits are gray
level whereas CIFAR-10 images are RGB. Increasing the pixel intensity of MNIST digits leads to
maintaining high classifier accuracy while at the same time making the job of the attacker harder
since now he has to increase the magnitude of the perturbation. In conclusion, this analysis suggests
that increasing pixel values is not as effective as increasing the SReLU slope. This, however, needs
further investigation. If the opposite is true, then it will have the following unfortunate consequence.
To counter the ReLU defense, the attacker can simply submit the scaled down version of the input
image.
Last but not least, that fact that this simple defense consistently works against some strong attacks
(e.g. PGD) is surprising. But please take these findings with a healthy dose of scepticism as I am still
investigating them. Future work should evaluate the proposed approach on other models (e.g. ResNet),
datasets (e.g. ImageNet), and against black-box attacks. Further, saliency and interpretability tools
such as [17] can be used to explain the observed phenomenon.
Acknowledgement. I would like to thank Google for making the Colaboratory platform available.
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Figure 3: Results of the ReLU defense against untargeted attacks over MNIST (left column),
CIFAR10-CNN1 (middle), and CIFAR10-CNN2 (right). Higher y value here means better defense.
6
Figure 4: Results of ReLU defense against 25 untargeted attacks using the Foolbox code repository, over MNIST (left column),
CIFAR10-CNN1 (middle), and CIFAR10-CNN2 (right). The first 2K images from each dataset were used. Top row shows the
average performance over all attacks. Bottom row shows the performance at the last epsilon ( = 0.3 over MNIST and  = 0.1
over CIFAR-10), for each attack. Higher y value here means better defense.
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Figure 5: Performance of the ReLU defense against the targeted FGSM attack over MNIST (top
row), CIFAR10-CNN1 (middle row), and CIFAR10-CNN2 (bottom row). Lower y value here
means better defense.
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Figure 6: Performance of the ReLU defense against the targeted FGSM attack over MNIST (top rows), CIFAR10-CNN1 (middle
rows), and CIFAR10-CNN2 (bottom rows). Each plot corresponds to converting images to a different target class; if they have
not already been classified as the target class). For some classes, the defense exacerbates the problem and helps the attack. On
average, however, the defense seems to be working, although not as effective as in the untargeted setting. Lower y value here
means better defense.
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Figure 7: Impact of scaling up pixel values against the untargeted FGSM attak over MNIST (top) and
CIFAR-10 (bottom; using CIFAR10-CNN1) datasets. The left column shows results with clipping
the pixel values to [0,1] range after scaling. The right column shows results without clipping. The
legend represents the magnitude of scaling. Higher y value here means better defense.
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Figure 8: CNN architectures used in the experiments (top: MNIST, bottom: CIFAR10-CNN1).
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